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Firm Size and the Information Content of
Over-the-Counter Common Stock Offerings
Robert M. Hull
George E. Pinches

We examine the announcement period of stock returns for 179 over-the-counter
(OTC) firms that issue common stock to reduce nonconvertible debt. We find
that small OTC firms experience returns that are significantly more negative
than large OTC firms. Regression tests reveal that firm size is a significant factor
in accounting for stock returns. Other tests establish as firm size a dominant
efiect. Our support for a firm size effect is consistent with a differential informa
tion effect given that firm size is positively related to the amount of information
available about firms.

I.

INTRODUCTION

A “pure” leverage decrease (e.g., a stock offering that reduces debt) alters
the mix of the firm’s securities without directly modifying the asset struc
ture. Consequently, a pure leverage decrease announcement should be rel
atively firee fi'om valuation effects that can occur when a security offering
raises proceeds for asset structure changes. Prior research (Copeland 8c Lee,
1991; Cornett & Travlos, 1989; Hull, 1994; Hull & Fortin, 1993; Hull &
M oellenberndt, 1994; Israel, Ofer, 8c Siegel, 1989; Masulis, 1983) docu
ments significant negative announcem ent period stock returns for pure
leverage decreases. This research generally concludes that the negative
returns are caused by negative valuation effects consistent with signalingmodels (Fama, 1985; Leland & Pyle, 1977; Ross, 1977) premised on infor
mation asymmetry between insiders and outsiders.
The pure leverage decrease research (and stock offering research in
general) offers no evidence th at firm size accounts for the negative
announcem ent period stock returns. The possibility that firm size can
explain stock returns should be explored given that a number of studies
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(Atiase, 1985; Banz, 1981; Chari, Jaganathan, & Ofer, 1988, Chandy, Feavy,
8c Reichenstein, 1993) show firm size to be a determ inant of returns for sit

uations other than security offerings. To the extent firm size proxies for the
amount of information activities (e.g., information gathering, processing,
reporting, and interpreting), the findings of these studies are consistent
with models predicated on differential information (Atiase, 1980; Klein &
Bawa, 1977; Wilson, 1975).
In this study, we examine 179 pure leverage decreases consisting of
over-the-counter (OTC) common stock offerings that retire nonconvertible
debt. We find that small OTC firms experience announcement period stock
returns that are significandy more negative than the returns found for large
OTC firms. The difference is consistent with the notion that less is known
about small firms. This causes a negative announcement (such as a pure
leverage decrease announcement) to be more informative, and thus more
negative, for small firms.
We perform regression tests on the total sample and find that variables
representing firm size best account for stock returns. For regression tests on
that half of the sample with the smallest firm sizes, we discover signaling
effects based on changes in insider holdings and banker actions. Regression
tests for the large firm size half offer support for signaling effects caused by
the relative change in the debt level.
We conduct additional tests on samples designed so that signaling
effects (namely, those resulting firom changes in insider ownerships, banker
actions, and debt levels) are not expected to impact the outcome. A differ
ential information effect stemming firom firm size is still evident. Finally, we
offer evidence that the negative effect resulting from firm size may be at
least partially explained by the fact issuance expenses are more cosdy for
smaller OTC firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
reviews theories that predict stock price behavior for pure leverage
decreases. In the third section, we present the data, methodology, and pri
mary tests. The fourth section contains the empirical results, while the final
section offers summary statements.
II.

COMPETING MODELS

In this section, we first discuss differential information theory. This theory
can link stock price reaction to firm size. We then review signaling theory,
in particular, those models that are cited as explaining the announcement
period returns for stock offerings that reduce debt. The predictions of these
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models are not based on firm size, but on information asymmetries between
insiders and outsiders.
Arguments for a Differential Information Effect

Models prem ised on differential inform ation (Atiase, 1980; Klein &
Bawa, 1977; Wilson, 1975) suggest that announcements by small firms can
disseminate greater inform ation, for example, in regards to identifying
mispriced securities. Misvaluation occurs when the current market value of
securities does not reflect the true value of the firm’s future estimated cash
flows. As argued by Klein and Bawa (1977), investors will find it more diffi
cult to estimate future cash flows if there is less information about a firm.
Thus, greater misvaluation can exist for small firms given that less is known
about their future cash flows.
Several argum ents exist to su p p o rt the prem ise th a t sm all firm
announcements convey greater information about security misvaluation.
first, privately developed information regarding small firms is costly. Atiase
(1980) asserts that the information search for small firms is more expensive
compared to large firms. Thus, private inform ation gathering for small
firms will be limited making their announcements more revealing. This
limited information gathering notion is consistent with Collins, Kothari,
and Rayburn (1987) who suggest that firm size proxies for the number of
professional analysts and traders processing the available inform ation
about a firm.
Second, there is less available public news on small firms. In particular,
studies (Atiase, 1980; Atiase, Bamber, & Rreeman, 1988; Grant, 1980) find
that the financial press publishes fewer items on small firms than on large
firms. As discussed by Atiase, Bamber, and Freeman (1988), the SEC and
FASB have differential disclosure requirements that typically exempt small
firms from certain disclosures.
Extant research supports the assertion that firm size is a determinant of
stock returns. Most of this research (Atiase, 1985; Chari, Jaganathan, 8c
Ofer, 1988; Zeghal, 1984) centers on earnings announcements. These stud
ies show that small firms (relative to large firms) experience greater positive
returns around earnings announcement dates. ^ Tliese findings are consis
tent with the notion that the earnings announcements for small firms con
tain more information. More recently, the research by Chandy, Peavy, and
Reichenstein (1993) finds that the strength of the market response to stocks
highlighted in Ihlue Line depends on firm size.They state that the response
is more positive for small firms because less information exists for small
firms than for large firms.
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Finally, the firm size research calls attention to the fact that differential
stock price reaction is not confined to NYSE/AMEX firms. For example,
Atiase (1985) finds a differential reaction to quarterly earnings announce
ments between small and large firm announcem ents equally within the
NYSE/AMEX and OTC markets. Thus, there is reason to believe that a dif
ferential information effect may exist for other events involving the OTC
market (e.g., OTC stock offering announcements).
Arguments for Signaling Effects

Signaling or information asymmetry models (Fama, 1985; Leland &
Pyle, 1977; Ross, 1977) are predicated on the notion that insider actions
can convey to market participants security misvaluation. Based on their
estimates about future expected cash flows, insiders may feel the stock price
is not representative of the true value. One major means of communicating
this misvaluation is through leverage changes where firms issue and retire
security types.
In regards to pure leverage decreases, signaling models predict that
stock for debt transactions can convey security overvaluation. For example,
the Leland and Pyle (1977) signaling model predicts that stock ojBFerings
signal unfavorable information about security value if the market suspects
insiders are lowering their ownership proportions. Insiders attain lower rel
ative holdings by concurrently selling shares through a secondary offering
(or by not purchasing the new issue). The debt level signaling model of Ross
(1977) suggests that stock for debt transactions convey security overvalua
tion because market participants will perceive that the firm’s future cash
flows may not be sufficient to service current debt levels. The extent of the
negative news increases as the relative am ount of debt retired increases.
Bank debt signaling models (Bernanke, 1983; Fame, 1985) argue that bank
ers signal inside inform ation by their decisions concerning bank loans.
These models suggest bank debt reductions will signal greater negative
news than nonbank debt reductions. This is because the market fears bank
debt reductions are caused by bankers who want to unfavorably revise loans,
or who refuse to extend loans.^
The pure leverage decrease research (Copeland & Lee, 1991; Cornett
& Travlos, 1989; Hull, 1994; Hull 8c Moellenberndt, 1994; Israel, Ofer, &
Siegel, 1989; Masulis, 1983) suggests that signaling models best explain
announcement period returns. For example, a debt level signaling effect as
hypothesized by Ross (1977) is suggested by Masulis (1983) and Hull
(1994). A change in ownership signaling effect consistent with Leland and
Pyle (1977) is mentioned by Cornett and Travlos (1989) and Hull (1994). A
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bank debt signaling effect in support of Fama (1985) is found by Hull and
M oellenberndt (1994). For some of their tests, the latter study also finds
support for Ross (1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977).^
III.

DATA, METHODOLOGY, AND PRIMARY TESTS

This section describes the data, methodology, and tests. T he prim ary
sources of common stock offering announcements are the Investment Dealers'
Digest and The Wall Street Journal.^ Sources for the descriptive data are (in
addition to the two above sources): Compustat Annual Files, Moody’s Indus
trial Manuals, and CRSP NASDAQ^ Price Files. The time period covered by
these sources is from 1973 to 1989.
Data

The sample consists of 179 common stock offerings that survive the fol
lowing four screens.
1. Each m ust be identified as a pure leverage decrease where a
common stock offering is undertaken to retire non-convertible
debt.
2. Each must have available data from the sources to calculate values
for firm size (described later) and the planned reduction in debt.
3. Each m ust be listed on the CRSP NASDAQ^ Return File and be
tra d e d d u rin g th e a n n o u n cem en t an d estim atio n p erio d s
(described later).
4. T he planned percentage change in outstanding common stock
must lie between a half percent and one hundred percent.
Table 1 reports descriptive data for the total sample and two halves
(“small” and “large”) formed according to firm size. Observations in the
small half consist of the 89 observations with the smallest values for firm
size. The remaining 90 observations have the largest firm size values and
form the large half. Rrm size includes equity value and debt value. Equity
value consists of the market value of common stock and the liquidation
value of preferred stock (if applicable). Debt value is comprised of the book
value of all long-term debt obligations and current liabilities.^
Since firm size is measured in dollars and a dollar can decline substan
tially in real value (e.g., purchasing power) over two decades, values for firm
size are adjusted bfefore observations are classified intoeither the small or
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Table 1
Descriptive Data for 179 Over-the-Counter Common Stock
Offerings that Reduce Nonconvertible Debt, 1973-1989
Total Sample
(n=179)

Descriptive Data

Small FintfSize Large Krmf’ Size
Half(n=^89)
H alf(n = 90)

Panel A: Time Profile

Observations for 1973-1976

32 (18%)*^

24 (27%)

8 (9%)

Observations for 1977-1979

31 (17%)

20 (22%)

11 (12%)

Observations for 1980-1982

74 (41%)

32 (36%)

42 (47%)

Observations for 1983-1985

34 (19%)

12 (14%)

22 (24%)

Observations for 1986-1989

8 (4%)

1 (1%)

7 (8%)

$142M®
($74M)

$40M
($38M)

I243M
($150M)

$15M
($9M)

$7M
($6M)

$22M
($15M)

Par Value of the Planned Debt
Reduction Dividend by Hrm Size

-13.9%
(-12.1%)

-18.1%
(-15.9%)

-9.5%
(-9.6%)

Planned Percentage Change in
Outstanding Common Shares

22.7%
(18.7%)

27.6%
(25.4%)

17.6%
(14.2%)

Panel B: Selected Characteristics

Firm Size
Planned Offering Size ^

Notes:

^This half contains observations in the total sample with the smallest firm size values.
^ This half contains observations in the total sample with the largest firm size values.
^The parenthesis gives the percentage of the column's total number of observations.
^ Includes equity value and debt value. Equity value consists of the market value of common
stock and
liquidation value of preferred stock (if apphcable). Debt value is comprised of the book value
of long-term debt obligations and current liabilities. Values are taken from sources nearest (yet
prior) to announcement date and adjusted assuming a five percent compounded annual
decrease in the value of a dollar over time. See the Appendix for details on the adjustment
procedure.
^ Means (medians) are reported. M represents millions.
^Price the day before the announcement times the planned number of new or primary shares.

large half. The adjustment procedure assumes that the value of a dollar
declines at an annual com pounded rate of five percent. The Appendix
details the adjustment procedure.
The time profile given in Panel A of Table 1 reveals that 41 percent of
the total sample occurs between the years 1980 and 1982. For these years,
36 percent of the small half and 47 percent of the large half are found. The
panel also shows that observations for the small half are more likely to be
found in the 1970s, while those for the lai^e half are more apt to occur in
the 1980s.
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Panel B reports that mean values for “firm size” and “planned offering
size” for the small half are less than one-sixth and one-third of the mean
values for the large half. This panel also reveals that observations in the
small half undergo relatively greater changes in levels of debt and common
stock. For example, the small half s means for “par value of the planned
debt reduction divided by firm size” and “planned percentage change in
outstanding common shares” are about 90 percent and 55 percent greater
in magnitude than the corresponding means for the laige half.
The sample includes 60 combination offerings. An observation is clas
sified as a combination offering when a primary offering is accompanied by
a registered secondary offering that is at least 10 percent of the total offer
ing (e.g., prim ary plus secondary components). O f the 60 combination
offerings, there are 34 in the small half and 26 in the large half.
The sample is also characterized by the inclusion of 90 offerings where
the debt being retired is identified as bank debt. O f these 90 offerings, there
are 39 in the small half and 51 in the large half. The occurrence of a com
bination offering is as likely for a bank debt reductionas for a non-bank debt
reduction.
Finally, of the 179 offerings, there are 12 that are non-cash offerings
(e.g., cash is not raised for the debt reduction but the new shares are given
in return for outstanding debt). The 12 non-cash offerings consist of eight
private swaps and four exchange offers. The findings of this study are sim
ilar with or without these 12 observations included.
M ethodology and Primary Tests

The ordinary least squares (OLS) market model procedure described by
Brown and Warner (1985) is used to test the hypothesis that a sample’s
mean daily excess stock return (ER) or cumulative excess stock return (CER)
is equal to zero. T he alphas and betas are calculated using the valueweighted CRSP NASDAQ index in conjunction with an estimation period of
Days -1-40 to -1-240 after the announcement date (e.g., after Event Day 0).
A lthough not reported, sim ilar ERs and CERs are found when using
Scholes and Williams (1977) OLS alphas and betas, a 200 day comparison
period before the announcem ent dates, or the CRSP NASDAQ equalweighted index.
To test the null hypothesis that the mean return for a small firm size
group is less negative or equal to the mean return for a large firm size
group, a standard param etric one-tailed t statistic for testing the equality of
the means of two non-paired samples is calculated. The research hypothesis
is that the small firm size group will have a greater negative return (e.g., the
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test statistic will be negative). When calculating t statistics, variances are
assumed unequal if F values reject the hypothesis that portfolio variances
are equal. Non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum z statistics are also given.
For the OLS regression tests, we report robust t statistics, F values, and
values. The White (1980) heteroskedasticit)^ adjustmentprocedure is fol
lowed when calculating robust ^-statistics. One-tailed ^-statistics are given
for explanatory variables since each has a definite prediction concerning
the sign of its coefficient.
IV

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

This section presents our empirical findings. A series of tests demonstrate
that a differential information effect, linked to firm size, is a significant fac
tor when accounting for the stock price behavior of OTC firms that issue
common stock to retire nonconvertible debt.
Excess Return Results

Panel A in Table 2 reports daily excess stock return (ER) results for a
seven day event period that includes event Days -3 through -H3. The panel
reveals a -3.46 percent cumulative excess return (CER) for the total sample
during the seven day period. Most of the negative activity (-1.89 percent)
occurs on the announcement day. We also find substantial negative activity
on Day -1-1 (-0.92 percent). The latter is explained by the fact that the mar
ket can be closed on the day of the announcement. There is also evidence
of leakage or late reporting, as significant negative ERs occur for event
Days -1 and -2.
In looking at the “small firm size h alf’ and “large firm size h alf’ col
umns in Table 2 , we see that the negative market response is especially evi
dent for the sm aller firms. A simple com parison of the two columns
indicates that substantial differences exist between the magnitude of the
daily returns. The last column in Table 2 reveals that statistical significant
differences in ERs between the small and large firm size halves exist for
Event Days 0 and -I-1. Although daily excess return (ER) differences are not
significant, the small half also has greater negative ERs for EventDays -1
and -1-2. For these four event days (Days -1 through -1-2) for which the small
half experiences greater negative ERs, the small half has a more negative
cumulative excess return (CER) of -2.57 percent.
Panel B in Table 2 gives CER results for the three event days consisting
of Days -1 through +1. The panel reveals that there is a -2.24 percent dif
ference when subtracting the three-day CER for the large half from the
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Table 2
Excess Stock Return Results for 179 Over-the-Counter Stock
Offerings that Reduce Nonconvertible Debt, 1973-1989
Event
Day(s) Total Sample (n=179)

Small Firm
Size H alf(n = 89)

Large Firm
Size H alf (n=90)

Small H alf vs
Large H alf

Panel A: Daily Excess Return Results

-3

0.07%; 0.39®
49%; -0.22

0.35%; 1.30
48%; -0.32

-0.20%; -0.80®
50%; 0.00

1.49; 1771^*
0.86

-2

-0.52%; -2.52**
36%; -3.66***

-0.52% ;-1.61
31%; -3.50***

-0.51%; -2.02**
41%;-1.69*

-0.02; 167
-0.97

-1

-0.47% ;-1.73*
42%;-2.17**

-0.55% ;-1.20
40%; -1.80*

-0.38% ;-1.35
43%; -1.26

-0.32; 145
-1.20

0^

-1.89% ;-6.08***
31%; -5.01***

-2.40%; -4.97***
28%; -4.13***

-1.39%; -3.56***
34%; -2.95***

-1.63; 176**
-1.40*

1

-0.92%; -3.40***
37%;-3.51***

-1.45%;-3.75***
31%; -3.50***

-0.39%; -1.05
42%;-1.48

-1.97; 176**
-2.07**

2

-0.06%; -0.26
45% ;-1.42

-0.23%; -0.61
39%; -2.01**

0.10%; 0.31
50%; 0.00

-0.67; 177
-0.92

3

0.33%; 1.54
53%; 0.82

0.36%; 1.29
56%; 1.05

-0.14; 177
-0.77

0.30%; 0.92
51%; 0.11

Binel B: Three—Day Cumulative Excess Return Results

-3.28%; -7.45***
27%; -6.05***
Notes:

-4.40%;-6.41***
24%; -4.98***

-2.16%; -4.08***
31%; -3.58***

-2.56; 166***
-3.24***

Three asterisks (***), two asterisks (**), and one asterisk (*) denote significance at the one,
five, and and 1 0 percent levels, respectively.
^The first row reports the mean excess stock return followed by the two-tailed t statistic (when
testing if the mean excess stock return equals zero). The second row gives the percent of the
sample that has a positive excess stock return followed by the two-tailed binomial z statistic
(when testing if the percent equals 50 percent).
^ The first row reports the one-tailed parametric t statistic (when testing the null hypothesis
that excess stock returns for the small group is less negative or equal to excess stock returns
for the large group) followed by the degrees of fireedom. The third row reports the z statistic
for the one-tailed nonparametric Wilcoxon test.
^ Day 0 is the announcement day. Assuming no leakage or late reporting, the announcement
is expected to impact the market on Day 0 or, if the announcement occurs after the market is
closed, on Day -h 1.

three-day CER for the small half. This difference is significant at the one
percent level for both the parametric and non-parametric tests. Although
not reported in Panel B, the same results are found for other announce
ment periods including two-day CERs and four-day CERs.
If a firm size effect is present, then it should be stronger if groups are
compared that have greater differences in firm size. We find this to be true.
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Although not reported in table format, tests are conducted when the sam
ple is partitioned into groups other than halves. For these tests, even stron
ger evidence that small firms have greater negative ERs and CERs is
discovered. For example, the three-day CER difference of -2.24 percent
found for halves increases in magnitude to -3.10 percent when those onefourth sample observations that have the smallest firm sizes (n=45) are
compared with those one-fourth sample observations that have the greatest
firm sizes (n=45). When the sample is partitioned into eighths, the threeday CER difference increases in magnitude to -3.65 percent. Furthermore,
the group consisting of those one-eighth observations (n = 22 ) with the larg
est firm sizes has a three-day CER that is not statistically significant from
zero (t = -1.08).
The Regression Model

Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression tests are conducted to explain
the announcement period returns of OTC stock offerings thatreduce nonconvertible debt. The general regression model is:
CER = bo + biLFS + b^SIZ + bsCOM -h b4BAN + b^LEV

where

CER is the three-day cum ulative excess stock re tu rn that
includes Days -1, 0, and -1-1.
LFS is the logarithm of firm size. (Firm size is defined in Table
1 and is expressed in millions of dollars.)
SIZ is a dummy variable that equals zero if in small firm size
half, or equals one if in large firm size half.
COM is a dummy variable that equals zero if a primary offering,
or equals one if a combination offering.
BAN is a dummy variable that equals zero if the debt reduction
is identified as a bank debt reduction, or equals one if the
debt reduction is not identified as a bank debt reduction.
LEV is the par value of the planned reduction in debt divided
by firm size.

The five explanatory variables are chosen in order to compare a differential
information effect (based on firm size) with three signaling effects that prior
research has found to be explain pure leverage decreases.
The first two variables (LFS and SIZ) are motivated by a desire to test
for a wealth effect stemming from an observation’s firm size. Differential
information theory (Atiase, 1980; Klein & Bawa, 1977; Wilson, 1975) pre
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diets positive coefficients for both variables. Since market participants know
less about the future cash flow possibilities for small firms, a more negative
stock return for a negative news release (such as a stock offering announce
ment) is expected for small firms.
The last three explanatory variables (COM, BAN, and LEV) attem pt to
test valuation effects associated with signaling models (Fama, 1985; Leland
& Pyle 1977; Ross, 1977) premised on information asymmetries between
insiders and outsiders. The motivation for testing these three variables is
supplied by the stock offering research that suggests signaling models best
explain announcement period CERs for pure leverage decreases. Details on
these three variables and their predicted coefficient signs are given below.
A signaling model predicated on changes in inside ownership propor
tions (such as Leland & Pyle, 1977) predicts a negative coefficient for COM.
For combination offerings, the market will be apprehensive that insiders are
among those selling secondary shares. Although published reports in the
financial press are typically vague in just referring to those selling as “cur
rent” or “principal” shareholders, investors (as a protective measure) would
likely assume that insiders are among those selling. This is particular true
for the 60 combination offerings in our sample where secondary sales aver
age about half of primary sales.^
A signaling model emphasizing the role of bankers (such as Fama, 1985)
predicts a positive coefficient for BAN. If bank debt offerings reflect favor
able inside information by bankers, then bank debt reductions should be
viewed unfavorably. For those 90 observations in our sample that retire
bank debt, investors are likely to believe that the reductions are caused by
bankers who want to unfavorably revise loans, or who refuse to extend loans.
A signaling model premised on relative changes in debt levels (such as
Ross, 1977) predicts a positive coefficient for LEV Greater negative values
for LEV are expected to be accompanied by greater negative signaling
effects. This is because market participants are likely to infer greater nega
tive news as the relative amount of the debt reduction increases.^
Correlation Results

Pearson and Spearman correlation tests reveal several pairs of explana
tory variables that have sufficiently large correlation coefficients (rhos) to
cause potential colinearity problems.^ First, as expected, the two firm size
variables (LFS and SIZ) are correlated. The Pearson (Spearman) rho is 0.79
(0.87). Because of this extremely large correlation, each variable is tested
separately when conducting regression tests on the total sample.
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Second, LEV is significantly correlated with LFS and SIZ. This is true
for tests conducted on the total sample, as well as for tests performed on
either the small firm size half (e.g., when SIZ=0) or the large firm size half
(e.g., when SIZ=1). For all of the correlation tests between LEV and the
firm size variables, the Pearson and Spearman rhos range firom 0.37 to 0.62.
Because these values exhibit substantial m agnitudes, regression tests
(reported in Table 3) are conducted with these variables used jointly and
separately.
Regression Results

Panel A in Table 3 reports regression results for the total sample. The
first firm size variable tested is LFS. The results of this test are reported in
the first row. The coefficient for LFS is the only coefficient that is significant
at the one percent level. This suggests that a firm size effect is a dominant
effect relative to <)ther tested effects. The coefficients for COM and BAN are
significant at the five percent level. This indicates that signaling effects
stemming firom changes in ownership proportions and the type of retired
debt (e.g., bank debt versus non-bank debt) are also important. The coeffi
cient for LEV is not significant implying that the relative size of the debt
retired is less important than firm size, insider sales, or banker actions.
The test reported in the first row of Panel A is repeated with the second
firm size variable (SIZ) replacing LFS. These results are reported in the sec
ond row. Once again, the coefficient for the firm size variable is significant
at the one percent level. Thus, a simple dummy variable is able to capture
valuation effects attributed to firm size. The results for the other variables
(COM, BAN, and LEV) in the second row are like those reported in the first
row.
When the tests in the first two rows of Panel A are repeated with LEV
deleted, the third and fourth rows reveal that coefficients for the remaining
explanatory variables keep their same significant levels. These two rows
reveal that deleting LEV increases the F value, while leaving the
value
virtually unchanged.
The fifth and last row in Panel A presents the results when the test is
conducted without either of the two firm size variables included. This row
reveals that the results are not materially altered in that the coefficient for
LEV remains insignificant and the coefficients for COM and BAN are still
significant at the five percent level. Any potential colinearity when LEV is
used with the firm size variables does not influence the significance levels.
However, when either LFS or SIZ is not included in the test, the fifth row
shows that the coefficient sign for LEV changes and values for the
and
F fall noticeably.
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Panel B in Table 3 reports results for the small firm size half (e.g., those
observations where SIZ = 0 holds). Adjusted
and F values reported in
this panel fall considerably compared to the previous panel. The first row
in Panel B shows that the coefficients for LFS, COM, BAN, and LEV are all
greater in m agnitude than found for the test in the first row of Panel A.
However, the smaller sample size results in a less powerful test. The t statis
tics for LFS, COM, and BAN fall in magnitude. The coefficients for LFS
and COM are now only significant at the 10 percent level, while BAN
remains significant at the five percent level.
The second row in Panel B reports that, when LEV is deleted, the coef
ficient for LFS is no longer significant while the coefficients for COM and
BAN are significant at the five percent level. The third row shows that delet
ing LFS produces results for COM, BAN, and LEV that are very similar to
those in the first row.
Panel C in Table 3 presents results for the large firm size half (e.g.,
those observations where SIZ = 1 holds). The
and F values in this panel
fall noticeably compared to the previous panel, with the values no longer
significant. T he only variable in Panel C with a significant coefficient is
LEV It now has its predicted positive sign and is significant at the 10 per
cent level. Thus, the findings for the large firms are quite different from the
small firms. The results for LEV indicate that the only evidence for a signal
ing effect is that predicated on the relative degree of the leverage change.
Consistent with differential information theory (Atiase, 1980; Klein &
Bawa, 1977; Wilson, 1975), the regression tests in Table 3 show firm size as
a significant explanatory factor when tests are conducted on the total sam
ple. For these tests, there is a greater variation in firm sizes. However, when
samples with fewer observations are tested (e.g., the small or large firm size
halves), the firm size variable is only marginally significant or insignificant.
These tests also dem onstrate that the market response is more negative
when common stock offerings of small OTC firms are accompanied by sec
ondary sales or are involved with reducing bank debt. For large OTC firms,
the market appears to be primarily concerned about the relative decrease
in the debt level. Thus, it appears that the signaling models posited by
Leland and Pyle (1977) and Fama (1985) are more applicable for small
OTC firms, while the signaling model of Ross (1977) is more applicable for
lai^e OTC firms.
Small Versus Large Sample Comparisons

Our next series of tests attem pt to fiirther determine if a differential
inform ation effect, attributable to firm size, is im portant. We compare
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CERs for small and large firm size groups when signaling efifects (found to
be significant in the regression tests) are not expected to influence the out
come. For example, the tests are designed so that homogeneity (concerning
the degree of insider trading, the bank versus non-bank debt nature of the
debt reduction, and the degree of leverage change) exists for the groups
being compared.
To assess if a firm size effect holds regardless of the presence of insider
trading, we separately examine the primary offering sample (n=119) and
the combination offering sample (n=60). It can be noted, that when the
combination sample is divided into small and large firm size groups, the
secondary offering as a percent of the total offering is virtually the same for
both groups. Thus, any differences in CERs (that occur) cannot likely be
attributed to differences in the am ount insider sales. To determ ine the
impact of firm size regardless of the degree of bank debt signaling, we sep
arately test the bank debt reduction sample (n=90) and the non-bank debt
reduction sample (n=89). Finally, we control for the degree of the leverage
change by comparing small and large firm size groups when values for LEV
(the planned reduction in debt divided by firm size) are similar. Since small
firms undergo relatively greater reductions in debt levels, the procedure
described below is used to make LEV values similar for the small and large
firm size groups being compared.
We first take the small firm size half (n=89) and delete those one-third
observations (n=29) that have the most negative values for LEV We then
take the large firm size half (n=90) and delete those one-third observations
(n=30) that have the least negative values for LEV This deletion process
produces small and large firm size groups that have similar values for LEV
For example, the mean, median, and standard deviation for LEV are -12.8,
-12.6, and 4.1 percent for the small group. The respective values are -12.3,
-12.0, and 3.8 percent for the large group.
Table 4 presents the results for small versus large firm size group com
parisons described above. The “small firm size group” colurrm shows that
the small firm size groups for these samples have parametric and non-parametric statistics for three-day CERs that are statistically significant from
zero at the one percent level. The magnitude of the negative CERs reported
in this column are generally about twice the negative magnitudes given in
the “large firm size group” column for the large firm size groups. The last
column shows that differences in CERs between the small and large groups
are significant at the five percent level or better with two exceptions.
The first exception is Test 1 for the combination offering sample. The
CER difference is only significant at the 10 percent level when comparing
large and firm size halves. However, the magnitude of the CER difference
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Table 4
Small Rrm Size Versus Large Rrm Size Comparisons for
OTC Stock Offerings that Reduce Nonconvertible Debt, 1973-1989
Sample^
Test

Small Firm
Size Group

Large Firm
Size Group

Small vs
Large Group

Primary Offerings
(n=119)

27*** I’
-3.45%
29% -3 25***

-1.73%; —2.74***
33%; -2.58***

-1.67**; 110*=
-2 38***

Combination Offerings
Test 1 (n=60)

-5.71% -4.73***
13% -4.62***

-3.50%; -3.51***
27%; -2.56***

-1.41*; 58
-1.57*

Combination Offerings^
Test 2 (n=40)

-6.37% -5.17***
10% -3.54***

-2.74%; -2.43**
30%; -1.79*

-2.17**; 38
-2.10**

Bank Debt Reductions
(n=90)

-5.16% -5.93***
22% -3.73***

-1.85**; 88
-1.91**

Non-Bank Debt Reductions
Test 1 (n=89)

-2.97% -2.86***
27% -3.02***
^.17% - 4 36***
24% -2.79***

-3.03%; -4.03***
24%; -3.43***
-1.89%; —2.41***
36%; -1.94*
-1.62%; -1.60
37%; -1.46

-1.83**; 57
-2.13**

-2.41%; -3.35***
28%; -3.36***

-1.99**; 118
-2.73***

Non-Bank Debt Reductions^
Test 2 (n=60)

Degree of Leverage Change^ -4.68% -5.28***
20% -4.65***
(n=120)
Notes:

-0.83; 80
-1.50*

Three asterisks (***), two asterisks (**), and one asterisk (*) denote significance at the one, five,
and 10 percent levels, respectively.
^ Unless noted otherwise, each sample being tested is divided into small and large firm size
halves.
^ The first row reports the mean three-day cumulative excess stock return (CER) followed by
the two-tailed t statistic (when testing if the CER equals zero). The three days include -1,0 (the
announcement date), and +1. The second row gives the percent of the sample that has a pos
itive CER followed by the two-tailed binomial z statistic (when testing if the percent equals 50
percent).
^ The first row reports the one-tailed parametric t statistic (when testing the null hypothesis
that the CER for the small group is less negative or equal to the CER for the large group) fol
lowed by the degrees of freedom. The third row reports the z statistic for the one-tailed nonparametric Wilcoxon test.
This test compares groups with greater differences in firm size than found in the first combi
nation offerings test. It compares those one-third combination offerings that have the smallest
firm sizes (n=20) with those one-third combination offerings that have the largest firm sizes
(n=20).
^ This test compares groups with greater differences in firm size than found in the first non
bank debt reductions test. It compares those one-third non-bank debt reductions that have the
smallest firm sizes (n=30) with those one-third non-bank debt reductions that have the largest
firm sizes (n=30).
^This test compares a small firm size group (n=60) and a large firm size group (n=60) when
values for LEV (the par value of the planned reduction divided by firm size) are similar for both
groups. The procedure is described in Section IV prior to presenting the results of this table.

is greater than that found for the primary sample test (-2.21 percent differ
ence versus -1.72 percent difference) even though the average difference in
firm sizes for its groups is $119 million less than that for the primary sample
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groups. Test 2 for the combination offering sample compares groups with
greater differences in firm size than found in Test 1. It does this by comparing
those one-third combination offerings that have the smallest firm sizes
(n = 2 0 ) with those one-third combination offerings that have the largest firm
sizes (n=20). For this comparison, Table 4 reveals that both parametric and
non-parametric tests are significant at the five percent level.
The second exception is Test 1 for the non-bank debt reduction sample.
The CER difference is only significant at the 10 percent level for the nonparametric test when comparing lai^e and firm size halves. The average
difference in firm sizes for its groups is $83 million less than that for the
bank debt sample groups. Test 2 compares groups with a greater difference
in firm sizes than found in Test I . This is done by comparing those onethird non-bank debt reductions that have the smallest firm sizes (n=30)
with those one-third non-bank debt reductions that have the largest firm
sizes (n=30). Like Test 2 for the combination offerings, Test 2 for the non
bank debt reductions produces param etric and non-param etric statistics
that are significant at the five percent level.
Besides the significant coefficients for LEV found in Panel C for Table
3, the degree of leverage change test is im portant due to the correlation
that exists between firm size variables (LFS and SIZ) with the relative size of
the leverage change variable (LEV). This test yields parametric and nonparametric statistics that are significant at the five and one percent levels.
These results show that firm size is a significant factor even when small and
large firm size groups undergo leverage changes that are similar. The
results are not biased by the presence of insider sales and banker actions, as
the number of combination offerings and bank debt reductions are similar
for both groups. Although not reported, the support for a size effect is still
evident when other relative sizevariables (resembling LEV) are analyzed in
a like manner.
The Relationship between Firm Size and Issuance Expenses

It is possible that support for a firm size effect can be explained by issu
ance expenses if the expenses im pact stock prices at the time of the
announcement, and the impact is sufficiently greater for small OTC firms.
Hull and Fortin (1993) offer insight into variables that can be tested to
determine the impact of issuance expenses on announcement period CERs.
They derive a flotation cost adjusted measure (ADJ) that, when added to
CER, gives an adjusted CER representing the fall in stock price if issuance
expenses are zero. ADJ can be expressed as -l*COS*SHR where COS is the
issuance expenses per new share and SHR is the planned percentage
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change in outstanding common stock. The values calculated for ADJ are
positive since COS is negative (to represent the negative cash flow associ
ated with issuance expenses) and SHR is positive.
Before using ADJ and its two components (e.g., the variables, SHR and
COS) to determine if issuance expenses can account for CERs, we perform
correlation analysis since we suspect colinearity if ADJ or SHR is used with
LEV This suspicion is confirmed. For example, the Pearson (Spearman)
rhos between LEV and ADJ are: -0.50 (-0.63) for the total sample; -0.42
(-0.43) for the small firm size half; and, -0.25 (-0.42) for the large firm size
half. Rhos between SHR and ADT are even greater in magnitude ranging
from -0.60 to -0.76.
Since the correlation between ADJ and LEV is substantial, we repeat the
tests in Tables 3 and 4 with ADJ replacing LEV We find that ADJ yields
results sim ilar to LEV w ith su p p o rt fo r size and signaling effects
unchanged. Tests are also repeated with SHR replacing LEV Once again,
results are similar (reflecting the fact SHR is highly correlated with both
ADJ and LEV). However, when tests are conducted with COS, results
change. The results are summarized below.
Correlation analysis discovers that rhos between COS and LFS are high
compared to those between COS and relative size variables (e.g., LEV or
SHR). For the total sample test, the Pearson (Spearman) rho between COS
and LFS is 0.45 (0.51), while the rho between COS and LEV is 0.13 (0.23)
and between COS and SHR is -0.12 (-0.25). The differences (in rhos between
COS and LFS compared to those between COS and relative size variables)
remain when the small and large halves are analyzed.
For the total sample regression tests, using COS with firm size variables
cause colinearity problems as coefficients for COS and firm size variables
fall considerably in m agnitude. Replacing firm size with COS produces
results for COS that are similar to firm size. The rhos betiveen COS and firm
size, along with their similar regression results, leave open the possibility
that firm size may be capturing negative issuance expenses (in addition to
a differential information effect). However, this interpretation raises several
questions. Why do we not observe stronger results for ADJ? Is it because sta
tistical significant support for ADJ is weakened by the possibility that a sub
stantial num ber of sample observations capture positive leverage-related
effects (e.g., as might result if onerous debt covenants are retired)? Future
research needs to explore variables capable of capturing positive leveragerelated wealth effects.
To further examine the relationship between a size effect and issuance
expenses, a test similar to that reported in Table 4 for the degree of leverage
change is conducted. When small and large firm size groups are formed
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(similar to that described for the degree of leverage change test) such that
COS values are equal, mixed support is found for a size effect. When threeday CERs for the small and large firm size groups are compared, the para
metric test is insignificant {t = -1.16) but the non-parametric test is signifi
cant at the five percent level (z = -1.97). Future research needs to continue
to explore if (and to what degree) a firm size effect captures an issuance
expenses effect.
V. SUMMARY
We examine 179 OTC stock offerings that reduce nonconvertible debt. We
find that small firms (relative to large firms) experience more negative stock
returns for announcements of common stock offerings that retire noncon
vertible debt. This is especially evident when samples with larger differences
in firm size are compared. To the extent firm size represents firms with less
available information, our findings are consistent with a differential infor
mation effect.
Regression tests on the total sample indicate that a firm size effect is a
dom inant effect. There is also evidence that signaling effects, based on
changes in insider ownerships and in actions by bankers, explain stock
returns. This is especially evident when the small half is tested. Results for
the large firm half differ. For these regression tests, any possible signaling
effect can only be linked to the reduction in the relative level of debt. For
larger firms, the market appears to be more concerned with the relative
amount of the debt reduction as opposed to what insiders might be doing.
Additional tests further show that a differential inform ation effect,
linked to firm size, is a dominant effect. For example, statistical significant
support for a firm size effect is evident when we examine samples designed
so that other signaling effects (e.g., those stemming from changes in insider
ownership, banker actions, and debt levels) are not expected to bias results.
The results of these tests (along with prior tests) point out that the strength
of a firm size effect depends upon the size of the sample. This is because
samples with more observations can produce groups with greater differ
ences in firm sizes.
Finally, we offer some evidence to suggest that a firm size effect may be
at least partially explained by issuance expenses. Future research needs to
further explore this possibility. A good starting point would be senior secu
rity offerings (such as debt offerings) where issuance expenses are not typi
cally large. If a firm size effect is found for this sample, then additional (and
stronger) support for a differential information effect could be established.
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APPENDIX
Classifying Observations Based on Firm Size

Before classifying an observation according to firm size, its firm size is
adjusted by recognizing the fact that firm size is measured in dollars and a
dollar’s worth of firm value can decline substantially over two decades. For
example, a $100 million firm in 1977 is relatively larger than a $100 million
firm in 1985. To compare reported firm size values for these two years with
out adjusting the values may produce erroneous conclusions.
For a firm that announces a stock offering during or prior to 1980, we
adjust its firm size by multiplying by an adjustment factor (/IF) given as
= (1 + r f
where r represents the annual compounded rate of decline in the value of
the dollar, and the exponent (n) is equal to the base year of 1980 minus the
year of announcement.
To illustrate, assume the following: firm size is reported by sources as
$100M (M = million) at the time of the announcement; the annual com
pounded rate of decline in the dollar (r) is 0.05; and, the announcement
occurs in 1977 which is three years before the base year. Given that w is 3
(e.g., 1980 - 1977 = 3), theny4i^ is 1.05^ and the adjusted firm size is
$100M*1.05^or (to the nearest million) $116M.
Now, keep the above numbers except assume the announcement occurs
in 1985 which is five years after the base year. The value for n is now -5 (e.g.,
1980 - 1985 = -5). T hus, AF is 1.05"^ and the adjusted firm size is
$I00M*1.05'^ (or $100M/1.05^) which is about $78M.
Like the illustration, this study assumes a five percent compounded
annual decrease in the value of a dollar over time and a base year of 1980.
However, the findings are similar if a zero percent or a 10 percent decrease
in dollar value is used. The similar results (for either 0, 5, or 10 percent)
can be at least partially attributed to the fact that about two-thirds of the
observations are clustered between the years 1978 and 1983. Thus, firm
sizes for these observations are not substantially altered when adjusted.
After an observation’s firm size has its dollar value adjusted, it can be
ranked by its adjusted firm size and placed in a size group. In this study, we
perform statistical tests by taking the particular sample being considered
and placing each observation into one of two groups. For most tests, we only
consider a grouping into halves. Thus, observations with the smallest firm
size values are placed in the “small half,” while those with the largest firm
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size values are put in the '‘large half.” For tests that seek to compare samples
with greater differences, groups other than halves are used. This causes
observations with middle firm size values to be discarded.
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NOTES
1. Atiase, Bamber, and Freeman (1988) summarize the research that indicates the relation
between accounting earnings announcements and aggregate investor reactions
depends on firm size. They note that this finding has emerged consistently fi:'om
research based on samples involving different time periods, different security
exchanges, and different definitions of “small” versus “large.”
2. Although less frequently cited than signaling models, negative stock returns are also
consistent with other competing models. For example, a price pressure model predicts
a negative stock return for an increased supply of stock assuming a downward sloping
demand curve. An issuance expenses m odel predicts negative stock returns if
stockholders, as residual owners, bear the costs of floating a new issue. Tax models,
rooted in the Modigliani and Miller (1963) model, predict a negative effect due to loss
tax shields. Optimal capital structure models (Jensen 8c Meckling, 1976; Kraus 8c
Litzenberger, 1973) predict a negative return if firms are moving away from optimal
debt levels.
3. Stock offerings research (Asquith 8c Mullins, 1986; Dierkens, 1991; Masulis 8c Korwar,
1986) where cash is raised to change the asset structure also finds general support for
asymmetric information signaling models. This line of research generally mentions
signaling models (Miller 8c Rock, 1985;Myers 8c Majluf, 1984) predicated on new
financing that is directed at changing the asset structure. Such signaling models are not
generally applicable when analyzing pure leverage changes. This research also cites
support for the Leland and Pyle (1977) signaling model (since its prediction is
independent of the purpose of the offering). For the Dierkens (1991) study, one of her
asymmetric information variables may very well proxy for firm size (and thus be
capturing a differential information effect). This variable is a dummy variable set equal
to one when the firm has 16 or less announcements listed in the Wall StreetJournal Index
for the year prior to the equity issue announcement. This dummy variable fares better
than other asymmetric information variables. This is true when tested either separately
or simultaneously with other asymmetric variables.
4. Publication in The Wall Street Journal of the planned offering typically lags by one day
the announcement date given by other sources (such as the Investment Dealers' Digest)
that gather or publish information after the fact. Thus, for those 38 observations for
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which The Wall Street Journal is the only source, the day before the date of publication
is taken as the announcement date.
Empirical results reported in this paper are similar if firm size is measured by the
market value of common stock.
Our findings are also not dependent on the inclusion of 34 observations where the
announcing firm makes other firm-specific announcements for event days -3 to +3. For
23 of these cases, the sources disagree as to whether all of the proceeds will be used to
reduce debt.
A negative coefficient for COM may also be consistent with agency models, rooted in
Jensen and Meckling (1976), if insiders include managers. Managers, who lower their
ownership proportion, are less likely to make wealth maximizing decisions on behalf of
stockholders. However, since the primary portion of combination offerings is for debt
reduction purposes, positive agency effects are also possible to the extent debt with
onerous covenants are retired. Thus, the net agency effect is hard to predict.
A positive coefficient for LEV is also consistent with Modigliani and Miller (1963).
They hypothesize greater tax shield losses as greater amounts of debt are retired. A
positive coefficient is also consistent with optimal capital structure models (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976; Kraus &: Litzenberger, 1973) if the stock for debt transaction causes
the firm to move away from its optimal debt level. However, since optimal models
hypothesize a negative coefficient when the firm moves closer to its optimal debt level,
the sign of the coefficient for LEV is difficult to predict based on these models.
For the remainder of this paper, rhos between pairs of explanatory regression variables
are not reported unless there is evident (in particular, from statistical significance and
sufficient rho magnitudes) to indicate colinearity. To further ascertain colinearity,
variance inflation factors are calculated for each regression test. Factor values are not
reported in this paper since the values never exceed 1.63 (which is well below
conventional levels for indicating multicolinearity). See Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch
(1980) for more details on the relationship between variance inflation factors and
multicolinearity.
As revealed in Table 1, there is a propensity for small firms to occur in the 1970s. For
this reason, the tests in Table 3 are repeated with a dummy variable (DEC) representing
the decade of occurrence (1970s versus 1980s) included. DEC is not significant at the
10 percent level in any of the tests. Also, a dummy variable representing the cash versus
non-cash offerings is not significant. Finally, tests are conducted with other relative size
variables suggested by the event study regression research of stock offerings (Asquith
& Mullins, 1986; Cornett 8c Travlos, 1989; Hull Sc Moellenberndt, 1994; Masulis,
1983). The results for these variables are generally similar to those reported for LEV.
For the results reported in Table 4, each small and large firm size observation is
classified relative to the sample being tested. Although not reported, similar results are
found if observations are classified relative to the total sample (n=179).
For example, results are unchanged when the percentage change in outstanding shares
is tested {t = -2.53 and z = -3.29).
There are 157 observations for which data is available from the Investment Dealers’
Digest to calculate COS. Values for COS range from -16.5 percent to -2.6 percent with
a mean (median) o f -6.2 (-6.2) percent. Of the 157 observations, there are 77 and 80 in
the small and large firm size halves. Mean (medians) for the small and large halves are
-7.0 (-6.9) percent and -5.4 (-5.6) percent.
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